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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, : Ca|se No. 870222-CA 
Appellant/Petitioner. : Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CAjSE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by 
this Court on March 21, 1989. Originally, this case was an appeal 
from judgment and conviction for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 
1-4. 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of the Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Pickard, denying 
reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point iln the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions . . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913), 
this Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material 
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are 
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated 
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
Cummings, 129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will 
establish that, applying these standards, this petition for 
rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. In 
its opinion in State v. Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (filed 
March 21, 1989) (attached as Addendum A), this Court misconstrued 
and misapplied the facts and law applicable to this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Given the fact that the Utah search and seizure 
protection has not yet been developed in case law, along with the 
fact that Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1980) is merely a codification of 
the constitutional protections against search and seizure, the Utah 
constitutional and statutory issues were adequately preserved for 
review in this case. 
The officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to 
detain the defendant, a passenger in a vehi| 
an equipment violation. The fact that a pe 
vehicle where the registered owner is not a 
sufficient to establish a reasonable articu 
vehicle is stolen and that the passenger is 
cle which was stopped for 
rson is a passenger in a 
jlso present is not 
lable suspicion that the 
culpable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE UTAH CONSTITUIONAb 
ISSUES WERE ADEQUATELY PRESERVED 
In its decision, this Court stated that "defendant failed 
to brief or argue these issues at the trial 
her statutory argument in her appellate brief." State v. Johnson, 
104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34. On the contrary, 
Support of Motion to Suppress, defense counsel specifically 
AND STATUTURY 
AT TRIAL. 
level and first raised 
in her Memorandum in 
mentioned Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Furthermore, in argument at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, 
she stated: " . . . I think it violates the Utah Constitution as 
well, although that has not been developed in the case law very 
well . . . " (T. 40). Furthermore, the statutory provision is merely 
a codification of the constitutional protections and is adequately 
covered simply by arguing that the seizure was unreasonable. 
By requiring trial counsel to do more than name the 
applicable provision of the Utah Constitution and acknowledge that 
Constitution. 
at the time of the hearing the Utah constitq 
been developed in case law leaves appellate 
"never-never land" where it is unclear exactl 
tional argument had not 
and trial counsel in a 
ly how much must be done 
at the trial level to preserve an issue for appeal. Specifically 
mentioning by article and section a provision of the Utah 
Constitution which is violated should be sufficient to preserve that 
issue for appeal. 
POINT II. THIS COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS AND 
MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE 
OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON. 
The impact of this Court's decision is to allow officers 
to seize all occupants in a car where the registered owner is not 
present, without requiring a showing that the car might be stolen or 
that, if it is stolen, the passenger is involved in any way. 
Pursuant to this decision, a nanny driving the family car and all of 
the occupants will be subject to seizure as will the husband and his 
friends where the wife is the registered owner and has a different 
surname from her husband. 
In this case, the officer testified that because the 
registered owner was not present, he thought there was a 
"possibility" the car was stolen. A "possibility" is not equivalent 
to a constitutionally required reasonable, articulable suspicion. 
Furthermore, a "possibility" that a car is stolen does not 
automatically implicate the passenger in any illegal activity. See 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-3 (Utah 1986). "[A] person's 
mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable 
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that 
person." J^ d. citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 
S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed.2d 210 (1948) 
In addition, even if the meager facts known to the 
officer at the time he detained Ms. Johnson did in some way amount 
to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen 
and that Ms. Johnson was somehow implicated, the officer exceeded 
the scope of any permissible seizure when he detained Ms. Johnson to 
run a warrants check on her. The permissible scope of any detention 
would be limited to investigation necessary to ascertain whether the 
vehicle was in fact stolen. This might include asking the driver 
(or the passenger) the name of the owner and how the driver came to 
be in possession of the vehicle along with 
check. However, it would not include runnil 
running a stolen vehicle 
ng a warrants check on 
the passenger, especially where further inquiry regarding the 
driver's possession of the vehicle has not 
if a seizure of Ms. Johnson were permissibl 
the proper scope, thereby violating the fou 
been made. Hence, even 
|e, the officer exceeded 
rth amendment. 
Because the only information knoWn to the officer at the 
bgistered owner was not 
ticulable suspicion so as 
the vehicle. The 
time he detained Ms. Johnson was that the r 
present, the officer lacked a reasonable ar 
to justify the detention of a passenger in 
detention in this case violated the fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and all evidence which plowed from the illegal 
detention must be suppressed. 
- 5 . 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court misconstrued and misapplied the facts 
and the law in this case, Ms. Johnson respectfully petitions this 
Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse the 
conviction and remand the case for dismissal or a new trial absent 
the illegally seized evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this /^ f April, 1989. 
Attorney for Defendaiit/Appe 
. I C. gJOx 
rOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATION 
I, JOAN C. WATT, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this 
case; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this 
Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this y day of April, 1989. 
—cJOAN C. WATT ^ ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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34 State v., 104 Utah A 
Cite as 
104 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Karen Marie JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 870222-CA 
FILED: March 21,1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
ATTORNEYS: 
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Dan R. Larsen, R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Orme. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals 
the trial court's denial of her motion to sup-
press and her conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance.1 We affirm. 
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff 
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a faulty 
brake light. Defendant was a passenger in that 
vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Stroud 
testified that prior to stopping the vehicle, he 
ran a check on the license plate and obtained 
the name of the registered owner. He then 
approached the stopped vehicle and asked the 
driver for her license. The name on the license 
was not the name of the registered owner. 
When Stroud requested the registration certi-
ficate, the driver was unable to produce it. 
Stroud then asked defendant for identifica-
tion, reasoning that there was a possibility the 
car was stolen because there was no registra-
tion and no owner present. After initially 
denying that she had any identification, defe-
ndant told Stroud her name and birthdate. 
Stating that he would be right back and 
expecting the driver and defendant to remain, 
Stroud returned to his vehicle and ran license 
checks on the two, determining that the driver 
was driving on a suspended license and that 
defendant had several outstanding warrants. 
He did not, however, inquire as to whether the 
car was stolen, nor did he know of any reports 
of stolen cars matching that car's description. 
He then wrote a citation on the driver and 
requested a backup police officer. 
When defendant was informed that she was 
being arrested for outstanding warrants, she 
exited the vehicle, holding a backpack which 
tnson CODE* co 
lev. 34 Provo. Utah 
hid the name "Karen" on it. Defendant initi-
ally denied that the backpack belonged to her, 
bult later admitted that it was hers. Incident to 
her arrest, the bag was searched and was 
found to contain amphetamines, drug parap-
hernalia and defendant's Utah identification. 
Defendant's version of the sequence of 
events varies from Stroud's. She testified that 
after Stroud received the driver's license, he 
asked defendant if she had any identification. 
Shi said that she did not. He told them to 
wait, that he would be right back, and retu-
rned to his vehicle for five or ten minutes, 
long enough for her to smoke a cigarette or 
twq. When he returned, he asked for the reg-
I istration certificate. When it could not be 
produced, Stroud asked defendant to return to 
his vehicle with him, where, at his request, she 
gavi him her name and birthdate. He then 
sentj her back to the other car. Fifteen minutes 
later, he came back to their car, gave the 
driver a citation, took defendant out of the 
car, frisked and handcuffed her, and put her 
in tl^ e front seat of the sheriffs car. She had 
possession of her bag at this time. Defendant 
stated that she gave Stroud her name and 
birthdate because she was required to do so, 
and ({lid not believe that she could leave. 
T^e issues on appeal are: (1) whether defe-
ndant may raise, for the first time on appeal, 
the argument that state law and article 1 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide 
greater protection than the fourth amendment 
of t^e United States Constitution against 
unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether 
defendant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was 
seized within the meaning of the fourth ame-
ndment; and (3) if there was a seizure, 
whether it was reasonable. 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will n^t disturb its factual evaluation unless its 
findings are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Walkdr, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The 
trial judge is in the best position to assess the 
credibility and accuracy of the witnesses' 
divergent testimonies. State v. Arroyo, 102 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Ct. App. Feb. 15, 
1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). However, in assessing the trial 
court's! legal conclusions based upon its 
factual! findings, we afford it no deference but 
apply a "correction of error" standard. Oates 
v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,659 (Utah 1988). 
UVAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
Defendant claims that her detention violated 
the foiirth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article 1 section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. She also argues that the 
legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §77-
7-15 (1980) was to provide greater protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
than is provided by the fourth amendment, 
and that her seizure violated the provisions of 
CODE*co State v. 
Provo, Uuh 104 Utah , 
both constitutions.2 However, defendant failed 
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level 
and first raised her statutory argument in her 
appellate brief. Nominally alluding to such 
different constitutional guarantees without any 
analysis before the trial court does not suffi-
ciently raise the issue to permit consideration 
by this court on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "[W]here 
a defendant fails to assert a particular ground 
for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence 
in the trial court, an appellate court will not 
consider that ground on appeal .... [M]otions 
to suppress should be supported by precise 
averments, not conclusory allegations ...." Stare 
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 
(Utah 1981), the supreme court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the point now urged 
upon this Court was unavailable or 
unknown to defendant at the time 
he filed his motion to suppress, and 
to entertain the point now would be 
to sanction the practice of withho-
lding positions that should properly 
be presented to the trial court but 
which may be withheld for the 
purpose of seeking a reversal on 
appeal and a new trial or dismissal. 
We, therefore, decline to consider this argu-
ment on appeal. 
SEIZURE 
Defendant avers that she was seized within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment because 
she felt that she was not free to leave when 
Stroud told her to wait while he returned to 
his vehicle to check on the driver's license and 
to run a warrants check on defendant. "A 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authority 
has in some way restricted the liberty of a 
person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). further, "[w]hen a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation ... but because he believes he is 
not free to leave," a seizure occurs. Id.; see 
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Defe-
ndant was, therefore, seized when Stroud took 
her name and birthdate and expected her to 
wait while he ran a warrants check. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, defendant was 
reasonably justified in her belief that she was 
not free to go. 
Now, the concern is whether the seizure was 
reasonable and permissible under the fourth 
amendment. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 
v. Rep. 34 35 
(5th Cir. 1984), wherein the Fifth Circuit 
specified three constitutionally permissible 
levels of police stops: 
(1) an officer may approach a 
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspi-
cion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is 
being committed. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
We conclude that the present case involves a 
"level two" stop. Thus, to justify the seizure, 
Stroud had to have a reasonable "articulable 
suspicion" that defendant had committed a 
crime. To determine if he acted reasonably 
under the circumstances, "due weight must be 
given, not to his inchoate and unparticuiarized 
suspicion or 'hunch,* but to the specific rea-
sonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience." Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 
1883(1968). 
At this point, we defer to the findings of the 
trial judge because of his preferred position in 
evaluating the witnesses' credibility. See 
Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. The record 
indicates that the trial court believed Stroud's 
testimony in concluding there was an articul-
able suspicion that defendant had committed a 
crime. Prior to asking defendant for identifi-
cation, Stroud believed that there was a pos-
sibility the car was stolen because the owner 
was absent and there was no registration. He 
knew that the driver was not the owner, but 
determined that it was reasonable to ask def-
endant her name to determine if it correspo-
nded with the owner's name he had learned 
prior to stopping the vehicle. The fact that 
Stroud initially chose to do a warrants check 
instead of a stolen vehicle check is of no great 
significance because not all stolen cars are 
reported immediately. The trial judge stated 
that where there is a legitimate traffic stop, 
the driver has a suspended license, and there is 
"no way of telling who the owner of the 
vehicle is and whether they have permission to 
drive it because the owner is not present," a 
reasonable officer would inquire regarding the 
identity of a passenger. In weighing the testi-
mony, the court was justified in finding that 
the amount of time defendant was required to 
wait, even though a passenger, was reasonable 
and did not take any longer than a normal 
traffic stop. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
36 State v. Johnson 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 CODE*CO Provo, UuJk 
Thus, there was substantial evidence for the 
trial court to find as it did. Although a seizure 
occurred, it conformed to constitutional req-
uirements in that Officer Stroud had a reaso-
nable articulable suspicion that the car could 
have been stolen, and defendant was not det-
ained for an unreasonable period of time. We, 
therefore, affirm defendant's conviction. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
1. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on 
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions between 
these two provisions and has "always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the same." State 
v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). 
However, in a footnote comment, the court indic-
ated that it has not ruled out the possibility of 
making such a distinction in a future case. Id. at n. 
8. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
Although the legal analysis applicable to this 
case is ably set out in the majority's opinion, 
I cannot agree with their ultimate conclusion 
that the arresting officer had an articulable 
suspicion that the automobile had been stolen, 
much less that defendant had in any way 
participated in the theft. 
The only facts relied on by the officer were 
that the driver's name was not the name of 
the registered owner and the driver was not 
able to locate the registration certificate. These 
facts are just as consistent with the more likely 
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from 
its rightful owner. Absent more-and this is 
all the officer pointed to-there was simply 
no articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, 
that the car had been stolen. 
I would accordingly reverse. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
104 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford Insurance 
Group, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Sylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury Fund of 
Utah, and Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Respondents. 
No. 8S0218-CA 
FILED: March 22,1989 
Industrial Commission 
ATTORNEYS: 
Stuart LH Poelman, Salt Lake City, for 
Petitioners. 
Eric V. doorman, Second Injury Fund, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff. 
OPINION 
DAVIDS0N, Judge: 
On June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an 
employee of Wicat Systems, injured her wrist 
while at work. In 1987, Pellegrini filed a claim 
with the Industrial Commission for permanent 
total disability. The parties stipulated that 
Pellegrini had a preexisting impairment of 
469ii prior to 1980, that she incurred an add-
itional 12% impairment prior to 1983, that the 
injury to her wrist caused another 24V© imp-
airment,1 and that she was now, with the wrist 
injury, permanently and totally disabled. The 
only issud before the- Administrative Law 
Judge was the proper apportionment between 
Wicat Systems and the Second Injury Fund. 
The A.L.J, determined that Utah Code 
Ann. §35^1-69 (as amended 1984) contr-
olled, even though Pellegrini's injury occurred 
in 1983, and so computed Wicat's share of the 
liability at 24/64ths or 37.5%. Wicat filed a 
motion foi( review claiming that the 1981 
version of section 35-1-69, which would 
have placed its share of liability at 12/64ths 
or 18.75%, I should have instead been applied. 
The Commission denied Wicat's motion. 
The sole issue before us is whether the 1984 
amendments to section 35-1-69 were proc-
edural or remedial such that they could be 
applied retroactively to an injury that occurred 
before the effective date of the amendments.2 
We hold th^t the amendments were not rem-
edial, and, therefore, did not apply retroacti-
vely. 
In workers' compensation cases, we gener-
ally apply the law existing at the time of 
injury. Moofc v. American Coal Co., 737 
